Abstract: This paper empirically analyzes a Massachusetts law (Chapter 40B) allowing developers of income-restricted housing to appeal local land-use decisions to a state administrative body. Based on a unique dataset, we assess whether Chapter 40B was more likely to be used by developers in municipalities that place stronger restrictions on development. We find that the use of Chapter 40B to overcome regulatory barriers depends on the type of project. For rental development, developers were more likely to use the law in municipalities that were relatively accessible to jobs and that placed relatively stringent zoning restrictions on multifamily development. The use of Chapter 40B for condominium development was more likely in larger, less well-located municipalities with relatively stringent wetlands regulations.
Introduction
Fiscal (or exclusionary) zoning has long been an attribute of land-use regulation in the U.S.
By deploying regulations such as minimum lot-size requirements, municipal governments can protect their property tax base (Hamilton 1975; 1976; White 1975) . Such regulations can drive the price of housing beyond the reach of prospective entrants who might consume more local services than they would fund via property taxes. The combination of fiscal zoning with jurisdictional fragmentation of the kind described by Tiebout (1956) is associated with uncompensated negative externalities, including longer commute times, increased air pollution, concentrated poverty, and racial segregation (Howell-Moroney 2008) .
Concern with the exclusionary effects of local land-use regulation motivated legal reforms, such as the 1969 enactment of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals
Act, more commonly called Chapter 40B after its location in the state's general laws (M.G.L.
ch. 40B, ss. 20-23) . According to a 1969 report by the Committee on Urban Affairs in Massachusetts, the law responded to "an acute shortage of decent, safe and low and moderate cost housing throughout the Commonwealth," caused by "restrictive zoning controls or similar local regulations" (Fisher 2013, 418-419) . In this paper, we investigate whether Chapter 40B operates according to its apparent legislative intent and is used more systematically in the municipalities that most stringently restrict new residential development.
Chapter 40B empowers private residential developers to challenge local land-use regulations if a municipality's stock of low-and moderate-income housing (as statutorily defined) does not satisfy a pre-determined threshold and the municipality has not undertaken statutorily specified efforts to make up the shortfall.
1 If a municipality declines to allow a project including affordable Dillman and Fisher (2009) , we label such mechanisms "housing appeals regimes."
The efficacy of Chapter 40B is controversial and the law is politically contentious. Ellickson (2010, (1020) (1021) observes that local development regulations in Massachusetts municipalities remain among the most restrictive in the U.S. Fischel (2011, 266) suggests that Chapter 40B
crowds out market-rate housing and encourages local governments to bar all housing development in order to minimize their affordable housing obligations. Fisher (2013) finds that while developers are able to obtain permits under Chapter 40B within a reasonable period of time and with a limited amount of litigation, most suburbs nonetheless remain out of compliance with law's affordable housing threshold. Some critics of Chapter 40B claim that, by facilitating the override of local regulation, the law results in negative environmental outcomes that are not adequately offset by social benefits (Flint 2002) . In 2010, Chapter 40B survived a statewide ballot initiative calling for its repeal.
Although Chapter 40B has engendered substantial controversy, evidence concerning its effects remains scarce. This study provides such evidence by empirically examining whether Chapter 40B was used during the last housing boom to break down exclusionary barriers. Our empirical approach hinges on the fact that developers can obtain regulatory relief under Chapter 40B only if they provide affordable housing. In most projects built by for-profit developers under Chapter 40B, twenty-five percent of the units must be affordable to moderate income We find that the use of Chapter 40B to overcome regulatory barriers depends on the type of project. Rental development generally occurred in larger municipalities that gave residents better access to jobs and had better infrastructure. Conditional on a municipality receiving multifamily rental development, developers were more likely to use Chapter 40B in municipalities that placed relatively stringent zoning restrictions on multifamily development. The use of Chapter 40B for at least one condominium development was more likely to occur in large, more distant suburban areas with more stringent wetlands regulations. We conclude that Chapter 40B has assisted developers in overcoming exclusionary barriers in the case of rental housing, but think that the desirability of condominium development under the law is more ambiguous.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes previous empirical research on housing appeals regimes; section 3 lays out our empirical strategy and describes our data; section 4 presents our findings; section 5 concludes.
Prior research
Although a relatively large body of literature provides technical descriptions and anecdotal accounts of housing appeals regimes, 3 the topic has received little empirical analysis. The existing empirical studies, moreover, rarely address the relationship between local regulation and state law, and they sometimes focus narrowly on subsidized housing. Lack of attention to local regulation is problematic because such regulation can create the principal barrier to high-density development generally and income-restricted housing, in particular (Chakraborty et al. 2009; Joassart-Marcelli 2007) . A narrow focus on subsidized housing is equally problematic, because unsubsidized housing depreciates over time, eventually substituting for subsidized housing (Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans 2007) . This study focuses explicitly on local regulation and accounts for all condominium and rental development during our study period. Compared the 129 municipalities in our final sample, those over the threshold have, on average, lower levels of educational attainment among residents, less land area, higher accessibility to jobs, less restrictive land-use regulation, and a lower proportion of wetlands resources subject to local regulation Therefore, development in these municipalities does not provide significant insight regarding potential outcomes for municipalities in our sample. Municipalities in states without housing appeals regimes could theoretically serve as counterfactual observations. Given both the pervasiveness of housing appeals regimes in the Northeast U.S. and the close relationship of housing demand to regional characteristics, however, we have found no plausible candidates.
In order to assess the role of Chapter 40B in local housing markets, we therefore analyze why for-profit developers use Chapter 40B for a higher proportion of rental housing and condominium development in some municipalities as compared with others. In particular, we ask whether local land-use regulation appears to affect the use of Chapter 40B, controlling for plausible non-regulatory determinants of housing supply and demand. Because our measures of regulatory stringency are unlikely to change dramatically over a short period of time (and in many instances our data do not allow us to observe such changes), we use cross-sectional models to explain the aggregate quantity of Chapter 40B development as a proportion all development -8 -wetlands regulations that prohibit building in buffer zones around wetlands may not be cumbersome municipality-wide, depending on the distribution of wetlands throughout the municipality. For certain sites, local wetlands regulations may limit the scale of a project, thereby impinging on developer profits. Developers may use Chapter 40B to override local wetlands regulations when they expect the value generated from higher density to exceed the costs of providing affordable units.
Because exclusionary zoning reflects decisions made at the municipal level, we examine the number of newly developed housing units permitted using Chapter 40B, relative to the sum of all Chapter 40B and Chapter 40A development in a municipality. Higher proportions of Chapter 40B development are hypothesized to be associated with more restrictive local by-laws and ordinances (authorized by Chapter 40A).
For our sample of 129 Boston-area municipalities (Figure 1 ), we compare the number of units permitted through the main Chapter 40B process to the total amount of permitted development, including that which the municipalities formally invite. The proportions for -9 -assessor data. Summary statistics for these measures are found in Table 1 and are discussed in more detail below.
[ or racial prejudice, municipalities may therefore be more willing to accommodate condominium development than rental development. Second, rental developments in Massachusetts during our study period were much denser than condominium projects (Table 1 ). The resulting difference in potential environmental harms and infrastructural demands may lead municipalities to prefer condominium to rental development. Third, while condominium development occurred in 125 of the 129 municipalities in our sample, multifamily rental development occurred in only 68 (Table   3 ). This gives rise to selection bias concerns in the case of multifamily rental development, which we address with the selection model described in section 3.2. Fourth, the location of rental development in the Boston area differs systematically from that of condominium development with respect to variables including job accessibility and infrastructural capacity (Table 4) .
[INSERT In order to avoid the bias that could result from such sample selection, we use a bivariate probit selection model. First, we model whether or not a municipality had any multifamily rental development during our sample period. Second, conditional on multifamily rental development occurring, we model whether any such development was permitted under the main Chapter 40B
process.
Specifically, let !! be equal to one if municipality i had any multifamily rental development during the sample period, and zero otherwise. Then the first stage model of development for municipality i is: For identification of the first stage, some variable in the vector x i must act as an instrument.
Such an instrument must be correlated with whether or not a municipality receives multifamily rental development, but not with for-profit developers' systematic choice to use the main Chapter 40B process for such development. We conjecture that multifamily projects require access to a public sewer, which is not uniformly distributed among the municipalities surrounding Boston (Table 4) . Inadequate sewer infrastructure may substantially increase the cost of new multifamily development or thwart such development entirely. But it should not affect whether for-profit developers of multifamily rental housing choose to use the main Chapter 40B permitting process instead of Chapter 40A or the Local Initiative Program.
Condominium model
The rationale for our two-stage multifamily rental model does not apply to condominium development. Only four municipalities in our sample did not receive any condominium -12 -development during our study period. Because the proportion of interest is defined for 125 of the 129 municipalities in our sample, selection bias is not a concern and we use single-stage models.
Because the main Chapter 40B permitting process was used in only 65 of the 125 municipalities with condominium development, however, we investigate both the continuous proportion and a dichotomous representation of our dependent variable. We estimate a Tobit model due to the mass of proportions at zero. We also estimate a probit model to assess whether the 65 municipalities with condominiums permitted under Chapter 40B differ systematically from the other 60 municipalities in our sample with condominium development. In this case, for each municipality j, let:
. Therefore our probit specification is based on:
where s j is a vector of municipal characteristics, and ! is a municipality-specific error term with ∼ (0, ! ). The results from these two models are similar, and we report the results from the probit model in order to maintain consistency of interpretation alongside the rental models.
Sample and Data Description
Our data on Chapter 40B development come from a survey of officials in 144 municipalities surrounding Boston, Massachusetts, conducted by the MIT/CRE Housing Affordability Initiative (Fisher, Pollakowski, and Zabel 2009) . We also considered other standard demographic variables for the municipalities in our sample, such as population density, median household income, and the percentage of the population identified as white in the 2000 Census, but exclude them from presentation here because they are strongly correlated with the other variables included.
We control for supply constraints with variables measuring the amount of land net of physically undevelopable areas and the capacity of existing infrastructure. Using data from the Massachusetts Office of Geographic Information (MassGIS) and the methodology of Saiz (2010), we derive the following measure of developable land area N in municipality i: Schuetz 2006, 47) , to equal one if less than 25% of the housing stock has public sewer access and zero otherwise.
As measures of zoning stringency, we use both the percentage of total land area for which each municipality allows new multifamily development by right (i.e., without special approval) and, separately, the percentage of total land area where new multifamily development is allowed (Schuetz 2008, 565) . Schuetz (2008) argues that the original passage of Chapter 40B influenced the nature of zoning subsequently adopted by Massachusetts municipalities to control multifamily development. She shows that, following the enactment of Chapter 40B, municipalities with a smaller stock of multifamily housing were more likely to adopt special-use zoning provisions for multifamily development under Chapter 40A. Such an approach provides greater local discretion over development outcomes, which we interpret as more restrictive than by-right zoning. Within both the sample of 129 municipalities and the sub-sample of 68 municipalities with multifamily rental development, our variables for by-right and special permit zoning are not correlated at standard levels of significance.
As a general measure of local attitudes toward development in suburban areas, we also use the assessor data to calculate the median lot size of single-family homes built in 1998 and 1999 in each municipality. This variable captures the actual lot size of recent single-family developments, in contrast to the measure of average minimum single-family lot requirements used by Evenson and Wheaton (2003) and Glaeser and Ward (2009) , which may include land not available for development.
Municipalities surrounding Boston contain varying quantities of wetlands and place different restrictions on development in buffer areas around these resources. To control for land area around wetlands resources subject to local regulation, we include a variable measuring the proportion of a municipality's net land area that is within a 100-foot buffer zone surrounding wetlands. Using GIS, we generated 100-foot buffers around areas protected under the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act (MassGIS DEP Wetlands (1:12,000)). For each town, we one if a town's wetlands bylaw (as adopted or amended by the end of the study period)
prohibited "building," "disturbance," "clearing," or "cutting" in wetlands buffer areas (Schuetz 2006, 41-42) . We scale this dichotomous variable by the width (in feet) of the protected area, to create a continuous variable from 0 to 100. In our condominium models, we also consider a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if more than 0.1% of a municipality's land area consists of coastal wetlands as defined by Massachusetts law.
9 Land in such municipalities may be especially attractive for condominium development and is frequently subject to additional state-level regulation. This dichotomous variable is uncorrelated with the municipal measures of wetlands resources and restrictiveness.
Findings
This section discusses the results of our regression models. decrease in the likelihood that any multifamily rental projects were built by for-profit developers under Chapter 40B. An increase from the median to the 90 th percentile (3.54%) correlates with a 32% decrease in such a likelihood. With respect to the percentage of municipal land area where new multifamily development is allowed by special permit, a decrease from the median value (2.11%) to the 25 th percentile (0%) correlates with a 1% decrease in the likelihood that any multifamily rental projects were built by for-profit developers under Chapter 40B. An increase from the median to the 75 th percentile (13.69%) correlates with a 6% increase in this likelihood, and an increase from the median to the 90 th percentile (80.51%) correlates with a 43% increase in this likelihood.
Multifamily Rental Development
These results are consistent with summary comparisons of municipalities that allow multifamily development by right and those that do not. Twenty-six of the 68 municipalities with multifamily rental development contained districts where multifamily development was allowed by right. In these 26 municipalities, for-profit developers used the main Chapter 40B permitting process for 36.1% of multifamily rental units, on average. In the remaining forty two Our results suggest that Chapter 40B has two significant direct effects on rental development. First, holding other variables equal, municipalities that allow more multifamily development by right are less likely to receive rental development under Chapter 40B. An increase of less than one percent in the proportion of land area zoned for by right multifamily use is associated with a nearly ten percent decrease in the likelihood that a rental project is permitted under Chapter 40B. Second, on the margin, more stringent local zoning pushes developers of rental housing toward greater use of Chapter 40B. We interpret the positive coefficient on the percentage of land requiring a special permit for multifamily development as indicating a more restrictive regulatory environment. More stringent local wetlands protection is not associated with greater use of Chapter 40B for rental development. Table 6 presents the results of a probit model concerning the use of Chapter 40B in the 125 municipalities with any condominium development permitted during the study period. The dependent variable equals one if at least one permitted condominium unit was developed by a for-profit developer under the main Chapter 40B permitting process. Our measures of multifamily zoning, included in specification B, are not statistically significant in this model. We find a negative correlation between median single-family lot size and the dependent variable, significant at the 5% level in specifications C and F, and significant at the 10% level in specification G. Consistent with our expectation, the stringency of local wetlands regulation is positively correlated with the dependent variable, significant at the 5% level in specifications E and F, and at the 1% level in specification G. 10 Our dichotomous variable for municipalities with We also note that job accessibility is well-correlated with almost all of the variables in the model, resulting in its lack of significance.
Condominium Development
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] Taken together, our estimates show that larger municipalities with relatively poor access to the region's jobs, but with smaller single family lot sizes and more restrictive regulations regarding wetlands, were more likely to receive at least one condominium development under
Chapter 40B during our sample period. This is consistent with summary statistics concerning our job accessibility variable, which has a mean of 0.08 for the 60 municipalities with condominium development under Chapter 40A only and a mean of -0.17 for the 65 municipalities with some condominium development under Chapter 40B. These findings indicate that, while Chapter 40B was used for rental development with relatively high job accessibility, it was used to develop condominiums that are relatively remote from jobs. The lack of statistical significance for the multifamily zoning variables suggests a more idiosyncratic use of Chapter 40B by developers for condominiums than for rental projects.
Our initial motivation for the use of median single family lot size was as a control for local attitudes towards development. In the results for condominiums, however, we think that after controlling for net land area and the presence of coastal wetlands within a jurisdiction, the lot under Chapter 40A), these results suggest that some existing density near local amenities or transit stops may be important for the financial viability of condominium projects.
Conclusion
Our study indicates that states can combat exclusionary zoning, while suggesting that Chapter 40B has been more clearly successful with respect to rental development than condominium development. We find that the majority of rental housing units in our sample were built though Chapter 40B. For-profit developers systematically use Chapter 40B to build rental units in municipalities with the most stringent restrictions on multifamily residential development, while using Chapter 40A to build rental housing in municipalities that accommodate more multifamily development by right. Consistent with Schuetz (2008) , our findings also point to a pattern of municipal special-use permitting that provides local discretion over multifamily projects, perhaps favoring for-sale products over rental housing. 11 The evidence concerning developers' use of Chapter 40B to overcome exclusionary barriers to condominiums is less clear. First, condominiums in the region are mainly produced under Chapter 40A. Second, our measures of by-right and special permit multifamily zoning are not associated with the use of Chapter 40B for condominium development. Holding other variables equal, however, municipalities with more restrictive wetlands regulations were more likely to receive a Chapter 40B condominium development.
The different characteristics of rental and condominium projects also suggest that Chapter 40B (and housing appeals regimes generally) might be more effectively targeted to rental Condominium development, by contrast, is more widespread throughout our study area, and our measures of multifamily zoning are not systematically related to the use of Chapter 40B.
Municipalities with more restrictive wetlands regulation, however, were more likely to have Chapter 40B condominium development during our sample period. While municipalities may use environmental ordinances as mechanisms of fiscal (or exclusionary) land-use regulation, suburban municipalities around Boston have a sensitive ecological environment that may deserve more stringent regulation (Meyer and Konisky 2007) . Explicit coordination between regulations in these two areas is an important and on-going challenge for policy-makers. For variable definitions, see Table 2 . This table reports the coefficients and robust standard errors of a probit estimation. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to one if at least one permitted condominium unit was developed by a for-profit developer under the main Chapter 40B permitting process. Four municipalities without any condominium development are excluded from the model.
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